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Statement of the Case 
Response to Whipple's statement concerning the course of 
proceedings and disposition in court below 
The Appellant, Aspen, (hereinafter "Aspen") takes exception to the following statements 
contained in Appellee's (hereafter "Whipple") brief: 
(1) Whipple contends that it hired a contractor who evaluated the heating system (HVAC) 
pursuant to Judge Brian's ruling and found some minor "finish" work which needed to be completed. 
Whipple further contends that the HVAC system would have been completed had it not been 
dismissed from the job by Aspen and that the system would otherwise have been compliant and 
satisfactory. (This statement implies that even though Whipple lacked proper licensure Whipple had 
a right to complete the HVAC work. Aspen expressly rejects the implied premise within this 
statement.) In addition, Whipple alleges that Aspen never had anyone look at the system as ordered 
by Judge Brian. (Page 5 Appellee's brief) With regards to these statements, Aspen respectfully 
makes the following observations: First there is no supporting citation in the record to support these 
propositions and Aspen believes a review of the record would provide no support. Second, the 
testimony of Anthony Neeley, Aspen's HVAC expert, is to the contrary. He inspected the system 
as ordered by the court and there were substantial problems which he felt needed to be repaired, in 
fact he recommended the complete removal of the three furnace systems. (Record 263) 
(2) Whipple impliedly represents [page 6 of Appellee's brief] that Mr. Kent Whipple was 
designated as an HVAC expert witness in its Answers to Interrogatories. In the discovery responses 
Kent Whipple was never identified as having any HVAC license or special HVAC expertise and was 
only identified as a "journeyman plumber" who would provide "testimony as to the quality of 
workmanship and operation of the plumbing and heating work that they had inspected and are familiar 
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with and were expected to provide testimony concerning the ability and qualifications of A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing and Heating to perform the services provided." (See Record 218, 219 in Answer 
to Aspen's Interrogatory #8.) 
(3) Whipple represents (page 7 Appellee's brief) that Whipple's counsel argued that "evidence 
of the liens had been filed ... since the liens were public record" and he (Whipple's counsel) asked 
the court pursuant to Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence to take judicial notice of the same. 
Counsel refers to a final summation on page 70; however, a copy of the closing argument was not 
transcribed to Aspen's counsel's knowledge, nor has one been provided to Aspen's counsel. In any 
event, simply because a document is also a "public record" does not exempt it from the normal rules 
of evidence, i.e., to have the document authenticated and properly admitted during the trial, which 
was not done in this case. 
Dispute with Whipple's Statement of Facts 
Counsel for the Appellant also takes exception with paragraph 10, page 14 of the Statement 
of Facts, specifically the last sentence in which Whipple claims "Kevin Monson and R. Lynn Padan 
came to Fenstermaker and offered to pay him directly if he made the larger invoice disappear." The 
trial court's finding on this point was opposite and any citation to a portion of the trial transcript to 
support this allegation, which was strongly disputed at trial, is improper as it attacks a finding of the 
trial court, without first marshalling the facts. 
Summary of Argument 
The trial court committed reversible error when it granted Whipple4 s motion for a new trial 
on the stated grounds of "in the interests of justice." This error was not simply "harmless" but 
substantially prejudiced Aspen. Without the lien evidence, which was introduced for the first time 
at the post-trial hearing in September 1996, there was no evidentiary basis on which the trial court 
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could find the necessary statutory elements to order "foreclosure" of a mechanics' lien. The court 
had already entered its decision on November 30, 1995, and it was improper for the court to reopen 
the matter to take additional testimony where the trial court specifically found (albeit by negative 
implication) that none of the other specific grounds set forth in Rule 59(a)(l)-(7)U.R.C.P. existed. 
Both parties argue in their respective briefs that following the trial the evidence was 
inadequate to support the trial court's judgment granting any foreclosure action of the mechanics' 
liens. However, the parties differ in their interpretation of what legal effect this has. Whipple believes 
because the evidence was inadequate, this supports its argument that independent grounds existed 
for the court to grant a motion for a new trial under Rule 59(a)(4)U.R.C.P.; and therefore, the error 
(in finding the grounds "in the interests of justice") was harmless. Aspen believes that Whipple's 
reliance on Rule 59(a)(4) U.R.C.P. is misplaced and that Rule 59(a)(4) is completely inapplicable 
under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, it being conceded there is an inadequate evidentiary 
basis, it was error for the trial court to order foreclosure of the mechanics' liens— at most all the trial 
court could have entered was a monetary judgment 
Whipple's interpretation of Judge Brian's ruling, granting Aspen's motion to dismiss as to the 
HVAC claim, is also incorrect. Once Judge Brian granted the motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff legally 
failed to prevail on the mechanics' lien foreclosure action with respect to the HVAC work and 
therefore Aspen was entitled to attorney's fees on this portion of the lien claim. §38-1-18 U.C. A. 
Having ruled that §58-55-604 U.C. A was controlling, it was error for Judge Brian to allow equitable 
recovery for the HVAC work in clear disregard of the state statute. The common law exception 
discussed in the briefs of both parties was inapplicable because Judge Brian, after applying the multi-
factor test, specifically found the statute to be controlling. 
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The trial court's evidentiary rulings had the cumulative effect of denying Aspen a fair trial. 
Kent Whipple should never have been allowed to testify as an HVAC expert, as it was clear he did 
not have the requisite licensing or the expertise at the beginning of the trial, nor was he disclosed as 
an HVAC expert during discovery. Basic concepts of fairness let alone the Rules of Civil Procedure 
require timely disclosure, if Kent Whipple was going to testify as an HVAC expert. The Rules of 
Civil Procedure envision an on-going obligation to notify the other party in the event their answers 
become misleading or incomplete, which is what occurred in this case. 
I 
The trial court committed reversible error when it granted 
Whipple's Motion for a New Trial on the stated grounds that it was 
"in the interests of justice" and said error was substantial—not 
harmless. 
On page 21 of the Appellee's brief Whipple concedes that the trial court may have committed 
error when it granted Whipple's motion for a new trial1 on grounds which were not expressly 
provided for in Rule 59 U.R.C.P. However, Whipple claims that such error was "harmless" because 
independent grounds existed under subparagraph (4) which in pertinent part provides: " . . . 
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision or that it is against law." 
Aspen respectfully submits that Whipple's counsel miscomprehends the purpose and intent 
of subparagraph (4). Subparagraph (4) is not available to a party to buttress their case in post-trial 
proceedings. The normal and usual application of subparagraph (4) is in the context of a jury trial 
not a judge tried matter such as this case. In order to understand the import of subparagraph (4) one 
must understand the context in which the rule evolved. The "Compiler's Note" to Rule 59 U.R.C.P. 
'Throughout the briefs both parties have made reference to the court granting Whipple's motion for a new trial There was, in fact, 
no "new trial" in the sense that both parties started from the beginning. What occurred was the Plaintiff Whipple was allowed to put 
into evidence the liens and other documents evidencing compliance with the mailing requirement under §38-1-7 UCA which then 
provided the trial court with the requisite evidentiary basis to find the statutory elements of a lien foreclosure action. 
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states that this rule is similar to Rule 59 F.R.C.P.; however, that is not entirely correct. Rule 59 
F.R.C.P. is much more broad in the scope and discretion accorded to the trial court. (A copy of the 
federal counterpart is attached hereto as addendum 1 to this brief.) Both the Moore's Federal 
Practice and the Wright, Miller & Kane treatises on federal practice note that in the federal courts 
there is a definite distinction between a motion to reopen (which is made prior to the trial court 
issuing its ruling or the jury rendering a verdict) and a motion for a new trial which is made following 
the decision of the trial court or the verdict by the jury. As a basic proposition, subdivision (4), which 
allows the court to grant a new trial where the evidence is "insufficient to justify the verdict or other 
decision or that it is against the law," creates a standard for the trial judge to apply in assessing a 
jury's verdict, i.e., whether or not the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or against 
the law. Volume 12(a) Moore 's Federal Practice. §59.13 [2] In actions tried without a jury, a new 
trial may not be granted merely because one party may be able to present a better case in another trial. 
See Volume 12(a) Moore's FederalPractice, §59.13 See also In Re Knaus. 47 B.R. 63 (Bank. Mo 
1985); In Re DuvaltMfg. Co., 4 B.R 382 (Bank. Pa 1980); Brown v. Wright 588 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 
1978); Kirby v. U.S.. 297 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1961); Aerated Products Co. ofL.A. v. Aeration 
Process, 95 F. Supp. 23 (D.C. Cal 1950) 
Whipple's argument that subdivision (4) allows a party, who has failed to present sufficient 
evidence during trial, the opportunity to make a motion for new trial to buttress their case in post 
trial proceedings is nonsensical. Such an interpretation of subdivision (4) literally creates an 
exception which would swallow up the rule. It would result in unnecessary delay and wasted effort 
by the court and counsel, as was the result in this case.2 In essence, it would create a standard with 
The post-trial portion of the trial record exceeds the pre-trial portion by almost threefold and took over a year following 
trial, which concluded November 30,1995, to complete. 
5 
no predictable outcome and each motion for a new trial would turn solely on the particulars of the 
judicial personalities involved in hearing the creative grounds in support of the moving parties' motion 
for the new trial. Application of such a rule, as observed by Judge Stewart, "would fatally undermine 
the essential judicial concepts of stability and finality of judgments and make justice almost wholly 
a question of the vicissitudes of judicial personality." (In Re: Knaus p. 65) 
There must be an end to litigation someday and free, calculated, and deliberate choices of how 
to try one's case are not to be relieved from lightly. In this case, Whipple failed to introduce any 
written evidence of the three separate mechanics' liens or lis pendens. (Again this case is in fact three 
consolidated cases and no independent evidence exists as to each of the three properties as to which 
foreclosure was sought.) Whipple effectively conceded, when it filed its motion for a new trial, that 
there was insufficient evidence to sustain an order of lien foreclosure. Counsel for Aspen indicated 
that an appeal was likely and in effort to bolster its case Whipple filed the motion for a new trial 
which the trial court improperly granted. If this Court adopts Whipple's argument that Subdivision 
(4) applies under the circumstances presented in this case, it creates a rule of law that can only lead 
to further confusion and endless litigation. 
Standard of Review. On page 23 of its brief, Whipple asserts that Aspen must show that 
the error was "substantial and prejudicial" and not merely harmless. Contrary to what Whipple states 
in its brief, it is a self-evident principle that without the written (documented) evidence of a 
mechanics' lien having been filed there is no evidentiary basis to support an order of foreclosure--at 
most all the trial court could have granted was a monetary judgment. Whipple's argument is 
unpersuasive, particularly in light of the fact that a mechanics' foreclosure action is statutory in 
nature, and it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to place into the trial record evidence of each of the 
elements necessary to show statutory compliance. See Projects Unlimited. Inc. v. Cooper State 
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Thrift & Loan. 798 P.2d. 738, 743, 745 (Utah 1998); AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development & 
Energy Co.. 714 P.2d. 289, 291-292 (Utah 1986). 
Prior to the court granting the motion for a new trial, there is absolutely no evidence showing 
compliance with the mechanics' lien foreclosure statute as required in AAA Fencing. Whipple, in 
support of its proposition that the record does show compliance with Section 38-1-7 U.C.A., cites 
this Court to pages 536-549 of the record; however, this portion of the record is the September 1996 
post-trial hearing which occurred after the trial court granted Whipple's motion for a new trial. 
Counsel for Whipple is correct when he states on page 24 of Whipple's brief that Aspen fails to 
l 
acknowledge this portion of the record, because this portion of the record was created following 
the motion for a new trial, not during the trial. Since Aspen's position is the motion for the new trial 
should not have been granted (because there were no grounds to allow such), Aspen does not 
concede that it is proper to consider that such evidence forms a part of the trial record which Whipple 
can rely upon that it has proved its statutory lien during trial In fact, by citing only to this portion 
of the record, Whipple effectively concedes that the lien was not proven during the trial, which is 
consistent with Aspen's counsel's attempt to marshall the evidence. 
II 
There is no basis to award attorney's fees particularly as such 
relates to the prosecution of any equitable portion of the HVAC work 
At page 27 of its brief) Whipple concedes that the "equitable value of the heating system" is 
included in the amount which Whipple is seeking to foreclose. Since Judge Brian granted Aspen's 
motion to dismiss the lien action with regards to the HVAC work, any amount attributable to an 
"equitable" recovery cannot, as a matter of law, be included in any statutory mechanics' lien order 
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of foreclosure. What else could be the legal effect of granting the motion to dismiss? Whipple's 
argument on this issue is simply illogical. 
Whipple contends on page 28 of its brief that it recovered on two causes of action: " in 
equity" and for "unjust enrichment." Neither of these actions were pled3 nor do either of these 
actions allow for the recovery of attorney's fees. The only cause of action contained in the complaint 
was for the recovery of a mechanics' lien claim. In Foote v. Clark. 347 UAR 36, 37 (Utah 1998) the 
Utah Supreme Court reiterated the controlling principle: 
Generally, attorney's fees in Utah are awarded only as a matter of right under 
a contract or statute. (See Cabrera v. CotreL 694 P.2d. 622, 625 (Utah 
1985); but see Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission. 885 P.2d. 759, 
782-83 (Utah 1994). (Awarding fees under this court's equitable power in 
original proceedings challenging telephone rate increase where petitioner 
acted as a private attorney general.) 
Although Plaintiff Whipple cites this Court to the case of Stewart v. Utah Public Service 
Commission, this dispute does not involve an original proceeding and adoption of a rule allowing 
open-ended application of the "equity" exception recognized in Stewart would essentially obliterate 
the general rule. See also Foote v. Clark, supra p. 38 where the Court states succinctly the following: 
In this regard we have mandated that a party seeking fees must allocate its fee 
request according to its underlying claims: See Cottonwood Mall. 830 P.2d. 
at 269-70 (Utah 1992). Indeed the party must categorize the time and fees 
expended for "(1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to 
attorney's fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there would have been an 
entitlement to attorney's fees had the claims been successful, and (3) claims 
for which there is no entitlement to attorney's fees." 
Whipple's statement on page 28 that the trial court did not err in failing to award defendant's 
attorney's fees because the record clearly indicates the defendant did not successfully defend against 
the HVAC lien is simply wrong. This statement ignores the law of the case doctrine and the clear 
Aspen fs counsel is cognizant of the fact that under Rule 15(b) URCP the pleadings may be amended virtually at any stage 
of the proceedings to do justice. See Rule 15 URCP; Archuleta v. Huzhes 353 17 (1998). However no oral or written motion was ever 
made to accomplish this. 
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import of Judge Brian's ruling, which granted Aspen's motion to dismiss the HVAC portion of the 
lien claim. 
Il l 
The trial court abused its discretion when it allowed 
Kent Whipple to testify as an HVAC expert. 
Whipple's counsel indicates that any objection to having Kent Whipple testify as an HVAC 
expert was waived because Aspen's counsel failed to preserve it for appeal. Aspen's counsel 
respectfully disagrees. In the total context of the trial (where Whipple had rested its case and was 
defending the adequacy of the HVAC system in relationship to Aspen's counterclaims) it is clear that 
the trial court was well aware the testimony that Kent Whipple intended to introduce dealt only with 
the HVAC system. When Kent Whipple was called to the stand during the second phase of the trial, 
it was improper for the trial court to have allowed him to testify as to the adequacy of the HVAC 
system when all that was ever disclosed in discovery was that he was a "journeyman plumber." 
Whipple concedes that Aspen's counsel pointed this out to the trial judge (see record page 1550) but 
asserts that Aspen's counsel waived such by failing to continually object. 
First, the purpose of the requirement for stating the objection is to put the court on notice. 
The Rules of Evidence require that to preserve an objection, a party must object with specificity, or 
else the party waives the objection. Rule 103(aXl) U.RE.; Salt Lake City v. Holtman. 806 P.2d. 235 
(Ut . App. 1991). Given the context in which Aspen's counsel raised his concerns, Whipple's 
argument of waiver is unpersuasive. Was the trial court apprised of the problem? The only answer, 
given the trial judge's substantial experience, education and training, is yes, he was. Second, the 
purpose of the appellate court is to make sure that there is a uniform application of the rules and 
consistency in the law. Willevv. Willev. 951 P.2d. 226, 230 (Utah 1997). Under the circumstances, 
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if counsel intended to utilize Mr. Kent Whipple's testimony in the capacity as an HVAC expert, he 
was obligated under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to state such clearly or in the alternative to 
supplement the response if the response at the time it was made was incomplete or otherwise 
misleading. See Rules 26(e) and 37 U.R.C.P. The failure to disclose that Kent Whipple would be 
called as an HVAC expert made Whipple's responses to discovery incomplete and evasive. Given 
the fact that the trial set of discovery served prior to the trial (July 23, 1995-Record 122, 124) was 
never answered, nor was Judge Brian's pretrial order complied with (Record 122), the incomplete 
responses compounded the problem which under the circumstances was misleading and unfairly 
prejudicial to Aspen. Aspen timely sought a motion in limine to prevent such a surprise. (Record 
122) When Aspen's counsel pointed out that the only qualification Kent Whipple had was as a 
"journeyman plumber," the trial court should not have allowed testimony from a person not otherwise 
qualified to render an "expert" opinion. See Rules 701 and 702 U.R.E. 
IV 
When Judge Brian granted the motion to dismiss the HVAC claim, 
any further recovery, whether termed equitable or 
legal, was barred by the statute. 
Aspen's counsel respectfully suggests that, distilled down to it's simplest form, Whipples' 
argument on this point is contrary to express legislative policy: 1) The primary goal behind enactment 
of the Construction Trades Licensing Act is to protect the public from inept tradesman. 2) The Trial 
Court determined that the HVAC system was defective. (Record 263) 3) This should end the 
argument over the application of the "common law exception." No matter how long Whipple has 
been doing something illegally does not justify the illegal action, particularly when Aspen was harmed. 
On page 16 of the Appellee's brie£ Whipple's counsel sets out the activities which a licensed 
general plumbing contractor is permitted to engage in. Whipple places emphasis on the wording 
10 
"provision of a safe and adequate supply of gases for lighting, heating, and industrial purposes." 
Counsel for Aspen would simply observe that allowing a plumber to pipe a gas supply for a heating 
system does not give carte blanc authority for a plumber to engage in the installation of a forced air 
heating system, an activity for which a separate license is required.4 Such reasoning would 
completely emasculate the need for an HVAC license, which is illogical. Counsel would further point 
out that on page 16 Whipple makes an unsupported allegation concerning insurance which is very 
material. Whipple alleges that it maintains liability insurance which protected Whipple's customers 
against any errors or omissions which might occur as a result of its installation of an improper heating 
system at 77 Thaynes Canyon. Although counsel cites pages 64-70 of the trial court record, there 
is no support for this allegation, by affidavit or otherwise, such as providing a copy of said insurance. 
Whipple's allegation is simply unsupported in the record as a whole. 
Consequently, what Whipple argues is that an unlicensed contractor, one who candidly 
admits, (page 18, Appellee's Brief) that it has actively engaged in the installation of forced air heating 
systems for more than 16 years and has simply gotten away with it without obtaining the proper 
HVAC license should be entitled to recover when it installs a defective heating system, 
notwithstanding the legislature's clear intent concerning licensing this type of activity. This is not a 
case where a contractor once properly licensed, inadvertently allowed its license to lapse. Whipple 
was never licensed to do HVAC work. Nor is it a situation where there are no complaints concerning 
the work performed without being properly licensed. Whether or not Whipple's counsel wishes to 
mitigate the extent of the heating system deficiencies, the fact of the matter is the heating system was 
found by the trial court after a four-day trial to have certain defects (Record 263). Whipple's counsel 
would have this court completely ignore the fact that the system was found to be defective, that 
4 
See Addendum 3 to this brief for the complete text of Rule 156-5 5a Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act Rules, 
particularly those concerning specialty license category S340 and S350. 
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litigation unnecessarily ensued, and had Aspen known that Whipple was not properly licensed, Padan 
would not have hired Whipple to install the HVAC system. (See paragraph D, page 3 of Padan's 
affidavit, appendix 5). Whipple asserts that its failure to understand its licensing requirement was a 
result of a good faith misunderstanding. This position is not supported by the record nor recognized 
by Utah Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. "It is important to note that the 
licensee is responsible to know and understand the law regulating his or her licensed profession." See 
page 16, Utah State Bar Journal Volume 11, No. 8, October 1998 
Aspen's counsel concedes that application of the common law exception normally requires 
a multi-factored test, but under the circumstances Whipple is not entitled to the benefit of the 
common law exception. Given the circumstances presented by this case, Judge Brian's ruling 
granting the motion to dismiss was proper and as a result, having once entered the order that "§58-
55-604 U.C.A. was controlling" in this case, the trial court was obligated to strictly enforce the 
legislative mandate contained in §58-55-604 U.C.A.. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellate courts are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring legal accuracy and 
uniformity of the laws of this state. Willevv. Willev. 951 P.2d. 226, 230 (Utah 1997). 
Aspen asks the Court of Appeals to take the following action: 
1. Reverse the trial court's order granting Whipple's motion for a new trial. 
2. Reverse the trial court's order of foreclosure and vacate the order granting 
attorney fees and costs to Whipple. 
3. Reverse the trial court's order allowing Whipple equitable recovery as to the 
HVAC system. 
4. Remand the case to the presiding judge of the Third District for assignment 
to a judge who has not previously tried the case. 
5. Remand the case with instructions to enter a monetary judgment in favor of 
Whipple as found by the trial court, without the equitable recovery for the HVAC 
claim. ($3,943.00 + $7,000.00 - $9,173.00) 
6. Remand the case with instructions to the Trial Court that Whipple failed to 
prevail on its mechanics' lien claims and to grant Aspen's attorneys fees and costs 
incurred at the trial and on appeal and to hold an evidentiary hearing on the proper 
amount of attorney fees and costs consistent with the principles set forth in Foote v. 
Clark* supra. 
7. Remand the case with such other instructions as the court deems necessary 
and proper. 
Respectfully submitted this£j£? day of November, 1998. 
HARRIS, PRES 
defendant/Appellant 
(original signature) 
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CIVIL RULE 
Rule 59. New Trials; Amendment of Judgments. 
(a) GROUNDS. A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties 
and on all or part of the issues (1) in an action in which there has been 
a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore 
been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States; and (2) 
in an action tried without a jury, for any of the reasons for which 
rehearings have heretofore been granted in suits in equity in the courts 
of the United States. On a motion for a new trial in an action tried without 
a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take 
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or 
make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment. 
(b) TIME FOR MOTION. Any motion for a new trial shall be filed no 
later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
(c) TIME FOR SERVING AFFIDAVITS. When a motion for new trial is 
based on affidavits, they shall be filed with the motion. The opposing 
party has 10 days after service to file opposing affidavits, but that period 
may be extended for up to 20 days, either by the court for good cause 
or by the parties' written stipulation. The court may permit reply 
affidavits. 
(d) ON COURT'S INITIATIVE-, NOTICE; SPECIFYING GROUNDS. NO later 
than 10 days after entry of judgment the court, on its own, may order 
a new trial for any reason that would justify granting one on a party's 
motion. After giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard, 
the court may grant a timely motion for a new trial for a reason not stated 
in the motion. When granting a new trial on its own initiative or for a 
reason not stated in a motion, the court shall specify the grounds in its 
order. 
(e) MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT. Any motion to alter or 
amend a judgment shall be filed no later than 10 days after entry of the 
judgment. [Adopted 1937; last amended 1995.] 
(Matthew Bender & Co, Inc) (Rel 116-12/97 Pub 410) 
Rule 59-1 
Tab 2 
59-3 NEW TRIAL 
SYNOPSIS 
A. OVERVIEW OF RULE 
§ 59.01 Text of Rule 59 
§ 59.02 Function of Rule 
§ 59.03 Procedural Nature of Rule 
§ 59.04 Constitutional Considerations 
§ 59.05 Coordination With Other Rules 
[I] Time Computation Under Rule 6 
[a] Weekends and Holidays Excluded 
[b] Three-Day Mail Extension Prohibited 
[c] Court Extensions Prohibited 
[2] Postjudgment Amendment of Complaint Under Rule 15(a) 
[3] Separate Trials Under Rule 42(b) 
[4] Special Verdicts, General Verdicts, and Interrogatories Under 
Rule 49 
[5] Judgment as a, Matter of Law Under Rule 50 
[6] Amended or Additional Findings of Fact in Court Actions 
Under Rule 52 
[7] Relief from Judgment Under Rule 60 
[a] Correction of Clerical Errors 
[b] Relief From Judgment 
[8] Harmless Error Under Rule 61 
[9] Stays of Execution Under Rule 62(b) 
[10] Inability of Judge to Proceed Under Rule 63 
[II] Rule 71A Eminent Domain 
[12] Applicability of Rule 59 to Special Proceedings; Bankruptcy 
§§ 59.06-59.09 Reserved 
B. NEW TRIALS 
§ 59.10 Procedure for New Trial 
[1] Motion Required by Party; Grounds Stated With Particularity 
(Matthew Bender ft Co., Inc.) (Rel. 116-12/97 Pub 410) 
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 9 ^ 
[2] Court Can Grant on Own Initiative 
[3] Court May Enlarge Issues 
§ 59.11 Time Limits 
[1] Motion For New Trial 
[a] Ten Days After Entry Of Judgment 
[b] Motion Before Entry Of Judgment 
[2] When Court Acts on Own Initiative 
[a] Ten Days After Entry of Judgment 
[b] Longer Period When Proper New Trial Motion Pending 
[3] Entry of Judgment Defined 
[4] When Late Motion May be Treated as Rule 60 Motion 
r
 ? 
[a] Correction of Clerical Error Under Rule 60(a) 
[b] Motion for Relief From Judgment Under Rule 60(b) 
§ 59.12 Effect of Motion on Time for Appeal 
[1] Timely Motion 
[2] Untimely Motion 
[a] No Tolling of Time for Appeal 
[b] Doctrine of Unique Circumstances May Permit Late 
Filing 
[c] Excusable Neglect May Permit Late Filing of Appeal 
§ 59.13 Grounds for New Trial 
[1] No Fixed Standard For Rule 59 Relief 
[2] Jury Trial 
[a] Reasonable Basis Test 
[b] Judicial Error or Misconduct 
[i] Legal Errors 
, [A] Prejudice Required 
[B] Jury Instructions 
[C] Jury Trial Issues 
[D] Inadequate Findings and Conclusions 
[E] Evidentiary Rulings 
[ii] Misconduct 
[c] Misconduct of Counsel, Parties, and Witnesses 
[i] Misconduct of Counsel 
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.) (Rel 116-12/97 Pub 410) 
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[A] Proof Requirements 
[B] Prejudicial Misconduct 
[C] Timely Objection Ordinarily Required 
[D] Court Instructions May Cure Harm 
[ii] Misconduct of Parties 
[iii] Misconduct of Witnesses 
[d] Newly Discovered Evidence 
[i] 
[ii] 
[iii] 
[iv] 
[v] 
[vi] 
[vii] 
Relationship to Rule 60(b) Motions 
Three-part Analysis 
Evidence Available After Judgment 
New Evidence Must be Admissible and 
Probative 
Evidence Not Cumulative or Impeaching 
Burden of Proof 
Bases for Denial of Motion 
Jury Issues 
[i] 
[ii] 
[iii] 
Selection 
Bias or Disqualification 
Misconduct of Jury 
[A] Compromise; Coercion; Absence of 
Verdict Unanimity 
[B] Access to Inappropriate Information 
[C] Independent Investigation; Outside 
Influence 
[D] Proof of Misconduct 
[f] Verdict Issues 
[i] Verdict Upheld if Justifiable 
[ii] Inconsistency of General and Special Verdicts 
and Interrogatories 
[A] Verdicts'Inconsistent With Each Other 
or With Interrogatories 
[B] Answers to Interrogatories Internally 
Inconsistent 
[iii] Verdict Against Clear Weight of Evidence 
[A] Role of Judge 
[B] Applicable Standard Unclear 
[g] Damage Issues 
[i] New Trial When Verdict Entirely 
Disproportionate to Injury 
(Matthew Bender & Co, Inc ) (Rel 116-12/97 Pub 410) 
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[ii] Inadequate Damages; Additur 
[A] "Additur" Defined 
[B] Additur is Constitutionally 
Impermissible 
[C] Current Use of Additur 
[iii] Excessive Damages; Remittitur 
[A] Court May Grant New Trial or 
Condition Denial on Acceptance of 
Remittitur 
[B] "Shocks Conscience" Standard in 
Federal Question Cases 
[C] State Standards Apply in Diversity 
Cases 
[D] Amount of Remittitur 
[E] Agreement to Remittitur Precludes 
Subsequent Appeal of Remittitur Order 
[3] Actions Without Jury 
[a] Grounds Similar to Jury Trial Bases 
[b] Effect of Motion 
[c] Motion to Reopen Distinguished 
[4] Insufficient Grounds 
[5] New Trial for Less Than All Parties 
§ 59.14 Grounds for Partial New Trial 
[1] Jury Trials 
[2] Court Trials 
[3] Effect on Time for Appeal 
§ 59.15 Time for Serving Affidavits 
[1] Supporting Affidavits Filed With Motion; Extension 
[2] Opposing Affidavits to be Filed Within 10 Days After Service; 
Extension 
[3] Court May Permit Reply Affidavits 
§ 59.16 Amendment of Motion for New Trial 
[1] Within 10-Day Period 
[2] After 10-day Period 
§ 59.17 Notice and Opportunity to be Heard 
f (Matthew Bender St Co., Inc.) (Rel 116-12/97 Pub.410 
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court determined that the trial court's finding of excusable neglect was entitled 
to deference and affirmed the district court's extension.13 
For further discussion of the doctrine of excusable neglect, see Chapter 6, Time. 
§ 59.13 Grounds for New Trial 
[ l ]_No Fixed Standard For Rule 59 Relief 
No fixed standard applies to the grant or denial of Rule 59 relief; rather, the 
applicable standard applied by the trial court in its exercise of discretion varies 
with the grounds for which relief is sought.l The general grounds for a new trial 
are that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, that,the damages 
are excessive, that the trial was,not fair, or that substantial errors occurred in 
the admission or rejection of evidence or the giving or refusal of instructions.2 
Further, a district court has broad discretion to grant a new trial when necessary 
to prevent injustice.3 These bases are discussed in [2] (jury trials) and [3] (court 
trials), below; insufficient grounds are discussed in [4], below, 
[2]—Jury Trial 
[a]—Reasonable Basis Test 
As a general rule, courts will not disturb jury verdicts in the absence of extreme 
circumstances, such as a case of manifest injustice or abuse of the jury's function. 
Courts will sustain jury verdicts if reasonable bases exist to uphold the verdict. 
In ruling on a Rule 59 motion, the court will search the record for evidence that 
could reasonably lead the jury to reach its verdict, drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the verdict winner.4 
1 3
 Deference to trial court's finding of neglect. Varhol v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 
F.2d 1557, 1563-1564 (7th Cir. 1990) (appellate court deferred to trial court's finding of excusable 
neglect but would overturn if excuse is frivolous; opposition did not challenge finding). 
1
 Applicable standard varies depending on basis for motion. Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands 
Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 242 (D.V.I. 1995) (standard varies depending on basis for Rule 59 motion). 
2
 General grounds for new trial. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251, 
61 S. Ct. 189, 85 L. Ed. 147 (1940) (non-exclusive list of grounds for new trial includes against 
weight of evidence, excessive judgriient, and trial unfair); Kowalski v. American S.S. Co., 954 
F. Supp. 140, 142-144 (E.D. Mich. 1995). 
3 Prevent injustice. Government fin. Servs. v. Peyton Place, 62 F.3d 767, 774 (5th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Flores, 981 R2d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 1993). 
4
 Reasonable basis test Nissim y. McNeil Consumer Prods. Co., 957 F. Supp. 600, 602-604 
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (motioh challenging jury verdict denied because court could not conclude that 
verdict so inconsistent with evidence as to constitute, manifest injustice in light of evidence and 
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.) (Rel.l 16-12/97 * Pub.410) 
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time of the trial despite due diligence to learn about the facts of the case 
(see [iii], below). 
• The evidence discovered must be of a nature that would probably change 
the outcome of the case (see [iv], below). 
• The evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching (see [v], 
below). 
[iii]—Evidence Available After Judgment 
A motion for new trial under Rule 59(a) may properly be based on the ground 
of newly discovered evidence.36 The evidence must have been discovered after 
judgment,37 and the movant must have been excusably ignorant of the facts at 
the time of the trial despite due diligence in an effort to learn about the facts 
of the case.38 
36 Newly discovered evidence. 
1st Circuit Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 477 (1st Cir. 1994) (decision to grant or 
deny in trial court's discretion; when much direct evidence is newly 
available, motion should be granted because second jury could better 
determine issues); see Superchi v. Town of Athol, 170 F.R.D. 3, 5 (D. 
Mass. 1996) (newly discovered evidence must be admissible and potentially 
affect the jury's verdict or court judgment). 
2d Circuit White v. Bowen, 835 F.2d 974, 979 (2d Cir. 1987) (evidence available 
three weeks before judgment is not newly discovered evidence). 
5th Circuit Government Fin. Servs. v. Peyton Place, 62 F.3d 767, 774 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(only exception to rule of nonappealability is when motion is based on 
newly discovered evidence). 
3 7
 Evidence discovered after judgment. 
5th Circuit Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 110 F.3d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(reversal requires clear abuse of discretion); see Government Fin. Servs. 
v. Peyton Place, 62 F.3d 767, 775 (5th Cir. 1995) (movant must be 
excusably ignorant of newly discovered evidence at time of trial). 
10th Circuit Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1966) (evidence clearly 
available during trial albeit unknown to movant is insufficient; movant must 
show that evidence discovered since trial). 
3 8
 Excusable ignorance despite due diligence. Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 
U.S. 399,419-422,43 S. Ct. 458,67 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1922) (party seeking new trial must be excusably 
unaware of existence of evidence during trial). 
1st Circuit D. Federico Co. v. New Bedford Redevelopment Auth., 723 F.2d 122, 130 
(1st Cir. 1983) (citing Moore's, holding that movant must be excusably 
unaware of existence of evidence during trial); Jay Edwards, Inc. v. New 
England Toyota Distrib., Inc., 708 F.2d 814, 825 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 
(Mailhew Bender & Co. Inc) (Rel 116-12/97 Pub 410) 
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[d]—Newly Discovered Evidence 
[i]—Relationship to Rule 60(b) Motions 
A motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence may be made 
under Rule 59 or Rule 60(b). If the motion is brought under Rule 60(b), it may 
be made within one year of entry of judgment;32 a motion made under Rule 
59 is governed by the shorter 10-day filing period.33 Because the Rule 59 filing 
period is so limited, motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence 
are usually made under Rule 60(b), provided the other requirements of that rule 
are satisfied. However, if the new evidence is discovered (or by due diligence 
could have been discovered) in time to move under Rule 59(b), the movant is 
subject to the time limitations of Rule 59.34 
For further discussion of the interaction between these two rules, see 
§ 59.05[7]; for additional coverage of the requirements imposed by Rule 60, see 
Chapter 60, Relief From Judgment or Order, 
[ii]—Three-part Analysis 
A three-part analysis applies to motions for new trials based on newly 
discovered evidence:35 
• The newly discovered evidence must have been discovered after judgment 
and the movant must have been excusably ignorant of the facts at the 
52 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
3 3
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b). 
3 4
 Party subject to Rule 59 time limitations. Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 50 (5th 
Cir. 1992) (newly discovered evidence ground for relief under Rule 60(b)(2); evidence must be 
material and controlling and clearly produce different result if presented before judgment). 
5th Circuit Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 50 (5th Cir. 1992) (newly discovered 
evidence ground for relief under Rule 60(b)(2); evidence must be material 
and controlling and clearly produce different result if presented before 
judgment). 
7th Circuit See Ball v. Chicago, 2 F.3d 752,760 (7th Cir. 1993) (post-judgment motion 
made within 10 days deemed to be under Rule 59(e)). 
3 5
 Three-part analysis. 
5th Circuit Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 110 F.3d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(reversal requires clear abuse of discretion). 
10th Circuit Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1966) (evidence clearly 
available during trial albeit unknown to movant is insufficient; movant must 
show 1) evidence was discovered since trial, 2) facts from which court 
may infer reasonable diligence, 3) evidence is neither cumulative or 
impeaching, and 4) evidence is material and likely to cause new result). 
(Matthew Bender & Co , Inc ) (Rel 116-12/97 Pub 410) 
59-57 NEW TRIAL § 59.13[2][d] 
Facts known to a party during the pendency of the trial but not disclosed to 
counsel until after the trial are not considered to be newly discovered evidence 
for purposes of Rule 59.39 
464 U.S. 894 (1983) (newly discovered evidence must be of type that would 
not have been uncovered by diligent search). 
2d Circuit See Music Research, Inc. v. Vanguard Recording Soc, Inc., 547 F.2d 192, 
196 (2d Cir. 1976) (no abuse to refuse proffered new evidence (public 
record released before trial) when no reason that information could not 
have been provided earlier). 
5th Circuit Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 110 F.3d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(reversal requires clear abuse of discretion); see Government Fin. Servs. 
v. Peyton Place, 62 F.3d 767, 774 (5th Cir. 1995) (movant must be 
excusably ignorant of newly discovered evidence at time of trial; after 
movant filed to adequately show that it could not have discovered evidence 
forming basis of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) motion before or during trial 
even with exercise of due diligence, movant may not prevail of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 59(a) motion based on same evidence); see Owens v. International 
Paper Co., 528 F.2d 606, 611 (5th Cir. 1976) (denial of Fed. R. Civ. P. 
59(a) motion affirmed because movants failed to make requisite showing 
that they were excusably ignorant of newly discovered evidence until after 
trial and had used reasonable diligence to obtain that evidence before trial). 
7th Circuit Roach v. Startny, 104 F.2d 559, 562 (7th Cir. 1939) (evidence known to 
party during trial is not new evidence despite failure to disclose to counsel 
and party's ignorance of significance of evidence). 
9th Circuit Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, 833 F.2d 208, 211-212 
(9th Cir. 1987) (evidence in movant's possession or could have been 
discovered through reasonable diligence is not newly discovered evidence 
for Rule 59 motion); Contempo Metal Furniture Co. v. East Texas Motor 
Freight Lines, Inc., 661 F.2d 761, 766 (9th Cir. 1981) (movant must show 
that failed to discover evidence earlier; due diligence required); see Angco 
v. Standard Oil Co., 66 F.2d 929, 930 (9th Cir. 1933) (abuse of discretion 
to reopen). 
10th Circuit Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1966) (evidence clearly 
available during trial albeit unknown to movant is insufficient; movant must 
show. 1) evidence Was discovered since trial, 2) facts from which court 
may infer reasonable diligence, 3) evidence is neither cumulative or 
impeaching, and 4) evidence is material and likely to cause new result). 
3 9
 Party's failure to disclose known facts until after trial. Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 
110 F.3d 1147, 1154-1155 (5th Cir. 1997) (facts known to party during trial but not disclosed 
to counsel until after trial are not newly discovered evidence). 
5th Circuit Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 110 F.3d 1147, 1154-1155 (5th Cir. 
1997) (facts known to party during trial but not disclosed to counsel until 
after trial are not newly discovered evidence). 
(Maithew Bender & Co., Inc.) (Rel. 116-12/97 Pub 410) 
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[iv]—New Evidence Must be Admissible and Probative 
To support a Rule 59 motion, the newly discovered evidence (see [iii], above) 
must be both admissible and probative. Further, the evidence must potentially 
affect the jury's verdict or the court's judgment. Stated differently, the evidence 
must be of such substantial probative value that a different result would have 
been attained if introduced at the original trial.40 
[v]—Evidence Not Cumulative or Impeaching 
To support a Rule 59 motion for a new trial, or a motion to amend, based 
on newly discovered evidence, the new facts must represent something more than 
merely cumulative or impeachment evidence.41 However, evidence of false 
7th Circuit Roach v. Stastny, 104 F.2d 559, 562 (7th Cir. 1939) (evidence known to 
party during trial is not new evidence despite failure to disclose to counsel 
until after trial and party's ignorance of significance of evidence). 
4 0
 Evidence admissible and potentially affect judgment See Superchi v. Town of AthoL, 170 
F.R.D. 3, 5-6 (D. Mass. 1996) (newly discovered evidence must be admissible and potentially 
affect the jury's verdict or court judgment); see also WEINSTEINS FEDERAL EVIDENCE (Matthew 
Bender 2d ed.). 
1st Circuit See Superchi v. Town of Athol, 170 F.R.D. 3, 5-6 (D. Mass. 1996) (newly 
discovered evidence must be admissible and potentially affect the jury's 
verdict or court judgment). 
5th Circuit Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 110 F.3d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(facts discovered must be of nature to probably change outcome of case); 
Diaz v. Methodist Hosp., 46 F.3d 492, 495-496 (5th Cir. 1995) (new trial 
motion properly denied when new evidence has limited probative value 
and would be used primarily for impeachment; newly discovered evidence 
in form of nonparty affidavit countering opposition testimony insufficient 
because no guarantee jury would accept affidavit and reject opposition 
testimony); Peteet v. Dow Chem. Co., 868 F.2d 1428, 1435-1436 (5th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 493 U.S. 935 (1989) (no clear abuse of discretion in denying 
motion because false testimony could not have affected trial). 
9th Circuit Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, 833 F.2d 208, 211-212 
(9th Cir. 1987) (evidence must be admissible and likely to affect judgment). 
10th Circuit Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1966) (newly discovered 
evidence must have real probative value, evidence that is material and likely 
to cause new result) 
4 1
 Not cumulative or impeaching evidence. Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 110 F.3d 
1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1997) (newly discovered evidence must be more than cumulative or 
impeachment evidence). 
5th Circuit Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 110 F.3d 1147, 1154 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(newly discovered evidence must be more than cumulative or impeachment 
evidence); Diaz v. Methodist Hosp., 46 F.3d 492, 495-496 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(Matthew Bender & Co.. Inc.) (Rel. 116-12/97 Pub.410) 
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testimony by a witness may constitute sufficient grounds for a new trial if the 
time requirements of newly discovered evidence (see [iii], above) and the 
admissibility and probative requirements are satisfied (see [iv], above).*2 
[vi]—Burden of Proof 
The party making the Rule 59 motion has the burden of affirmatively proving 
that the evidence on which the motion is based existed at the time of the trial 
but was not discovered in time to use at the trial, although the party diligently 
prepared for trial (see [iii], above). Additionally, the movant must allege the 
nature of the evidence, showing that the evidence is admissible and probative, 
that it is not merely cumulative, and will not be used primarily for impeachment. 
Finally, the movant must convince the court that, if the evidence had been 
introduced at the trial, a different result would have been reached (see [iv], [v], 
above). The movant should supply whatever proof is available, such as affidavits 
and documentary evidence, to support the motion.43 
[vii]—Bases for Denial of Motion 
Evidence that was available and known during the trial, but that was not 
submitted to the court, does not constitute sufficient grounds for a Rule 59 
motion.44 Similarly, evidence that supports a new legal theory of the case that 
(new trial motion properly denied when new evidence, in form of nonparty 
affidavit countering opposition testimony, insufficient because has limited 
probative value and would be used primarily for impeachment). 
10th Circuit Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1966) (movant must show 
that evidence is neither cumulative or impeaching). 
42 Evidence of false testimony. Phillips v.'Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 556 F.2d 702, 705 
(4th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980) (abuse of trial court's discretion to credit 
witness's testimony after proof was submitted that witness committed perjury, but court made no 
attempt to determine extent of perjury). 
4 3 Movant's burden of proof. Morgan v. Labiak, 368 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1966) (movant 
must show 1) evidence was discovered since trial, 2) facts from which court may infer reasonable 
diligence, 3) evidence is neither cumulative or impeaching, and 4) evidence is material and likely 
to cause new result). 
2d Circuit Petition of Wetzien, 68 F. Supp. 1000, 1003 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). 
10th Circuit Morgan v, Labiak, 368 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1966) (movant must show 
1) evidence* was discovered since trial, 2) facts from which court may infer 
reasonable diligence, 3) evidence is neither cumulative or impeaching, and 
4) evidence is material and likely to cause new result). 
4 4
 Evidence available during trial may not be basis for motion. Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota 
Motor Sales, USA, 833 F.2d 208,1210-212 (9th Cir. 1987) (new trial motion may not be based 
on evidence that was available during trial). 
(Matthew Bender & Co, Inc) (Rel 116-12/97 Pub 410) 
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was not introduced at the original trial is not an adequate basis for a motion 
for a new trial.45 In this situation, the moving party should move to amend the 
pleadings to add the new theory to the case and then move to reopen in order 
to introduce additional relevant proof {see Ch. 60, Relief From Judgment or 
Order; see also § 59.13[3][c]). 
Evidence that is merely cumulative, or that is introduced solely to impeach, 
is not proper grounds for a new trial under Rule 59.46 However, evidence of 
false testimony by a witness may constitute sufficient grounds for a new trial 
if the requirements of newly discovered evidence are met.47 
[e]—Jury Issues 
[i]—Selection 
A new trial may properly be granted based on denial of peremptory chal-
lenges,48 or on the systematic exclusion of a particular group from service on 
4 5
 Evidence supporting unused legal theory may not be basis of motion. Toops v. United 
States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 871 F. Supp. 284, 294-295 (S.D. Tex. 1995) rev'd on other grounds, 
sub nom. Toops v. Gulf Coast Marine, Inc., 72 F. 3d 483 (5th Cir. 1996) (mere assertion of new 
line of case law insufficient for new trial motion). 
4 6
 Newly discovered evidence may not be cumulative or used solely for impeachment. Me-
sarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 77 S. Ct. 1, 5, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1956) (newly discovered evidence 
may not be merely cumulative). 
5th Circuit Diaz v. Methodist Hosp., 46 F. 3d 492, 495-496 (5th Cir. 1995) (newly 
discovered evidence in form of nonparty affidavit countering opposition 
testimony insufficient because offered primarily to impeach and no 
guarantee jury would accept affidavit and reject opposition testimony); see 
Trans Mississippi Corp. v. United States, 494 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion not granted based on cumulative or 
impeaching evidence). 
7th Circuit Wroblewski v. Exchange Ins. Assoc, 273 F.2d 158, 162 (7th Cir. 1959) 
(evidence to impeach witness* credibility insufficient). 
4 7
 Evidence of false testimony may warrant new trial. Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum 
Corp., 556 F.2d 702, 705 (4th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980) (abuse of trial court's 
discretion to credit witness's testimony after proof was submitted that witness committed perjury, 
but court made no attempt to determine extent of perjury). 
4 8
 Denial of peremptory challenges. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 
548, 555-556, 104 S. Ct. 845, 78 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1984) (plaintiff prevented from intelligently using 
preemptory challenges is not automatically entitled to new trial; plaintiff must show prejudice, 
something more than possible removal of juror). 
7th Circuit Cf. Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152, 155-156 (7th Cir. 1988) (order 
requiring new jury without exercise of peremptory challenges should not 
be granted on eve of trial). 
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.) (Re!. 116-12/97 Pub.410) 
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If the answers cannot be reconciled, the judge may not enter judgment based 
on selecting from among inconsistent answers: if the jury has not been discharged, 
the court should return the matter to the jury for further consideration;82 if the 
jury has been discharged, the court must order a new trial.83 
[Hi]—Verdict Against Clear Weight of Evidence 
[A]—Role of Judge 
A motion for a new trial may be granted if the trial court determines that the 
evidence presented at trial does not support the jury's verdict or the amount of 
damages awarded.84 A trial couri's discretion to grant a new trial when the verdict 
is against the clear weight of the evidence includes ordering a new trial outright 
or conditioning the order on the verdict winner's refusal to accept a reduction 
in the amount of damages {see [g][iiiL below (remittitur)).85 
The judge should determine whether the verdict is consistent with the evidence 
after considering all of the events of trial. The judge must review the evidence, 
view all the evidence as a whole, and weigh the relative strengths and weaknesses 
of the evidence. Such a review must be done considering the credibility of the 
witnesses, conflicting testimony, and the forcefulness of the evidence.86 When 
i . 
8
* Return for further jury consideration. See Turyna v.' Martam Constr. Co., 83 F.3d 178 
(7th Cir. 1996) (one option when jury returns factually inconsistent verdicts is to return matter 
to jury; after discharge, only option is new trial). 
8 3
 New trial mandatory after discharge. See Turyna v. Martam Constr. Co., 83 F.3d 178, 181 
(7th Cir. 1996) (when jury returns factually inconsistent verdicts and is discharged, only option 
is new trial). 
8 4
 New trial when verdict against weight of evidence. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op, 
Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 540, 78 S. Ct. 893, 2 L. Ed. 2d 953 (1958). 
1st Circuit Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. A., Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 482-483 (1st 
Cir. 1997). 
3d Circuit Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 163 F.R D 237, 242 (D V I 1995) 
(court empowered to overturn verdict when against weight of evidence but 
power is severely circumscribed). 
7th Circuit General Foam Fabricators, Inc. v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 695 F.2d 281, 
285, 288 (7th Cir. 1982) (new trial properly granted when verdict against 
weight of evidence). 
8 5
 Discretion to order new trial or condition new trial on remittitur. Gasperini v. Center 
for Humanities, 516 U.S. —, 116 S. Ct. 2211, 2222, 135 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1996) (citing Moore's; 
discretion to grant new trial when verdict is against weight of evidence includes ordering new 
trial outright or conditioning the order on the verdict winner's refusal to accept remittitur), t 
8 6
 Trial court determines whether verdict consistent with evidence. 
(Matthew Bender &. Co. Inc) (Rel 116-12/97 Pub 410) 
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the trial is lengthy and complicated and Involves subject matters outside the 
ordinary knowledge of jurors, the court should more closely scrutinize the verdict; 
when the subject matter of the trial is simple and easily comprehended by 
intelligent laypersons, the court should use less demanding scrutiny.87 However, 
the judge is not permitted to merely substitute his or her judgment and 
determination of the credibility of witnesses for that of the jury {see 
§ 59.54[4][a]).88 A new trial is warranted only if the verdict is so clearly against 
the weight of the evidence as to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice {see 
[B], below)** 
3d Circuit Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 242-243 (D.V.I. 
1995) (court must review evidence and scrutinize verdict; new trial granted 
when record shows verdict results in miscarriage of justice, cries out to 
be overturned, or shocks conscience; verdict must have more than 
evidentiary basis, verdict must be plausible in light of full evidentiary 
record); Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1348-1349 
(3d Cir. 1991) (against charge that verdict against weight of evidence, new 
trial granted when verdict so clearly against weight as to constitute 
miscarriage of justice). 
8th Circuit See, e.g., Lincoln Carpet Mills, Inc. v. Singer Co., 549 F.2d 80, 82.(8th 
Cir. 1977) (new trial motion requires judge to review all evidence and 
exercise independent judgment to determine whether or not verdict against 
clear weight of evidence); Simpson v. Skelly Oil Co., 371 F.2d 563, 566-
567 (8th Cir. 1967) (on motion for new trial, court should analyze and 
appraise the weight of all the evidence and any other relevant factors). 
8 7
 Degree of scrutiny relates to trial's length and complexity* Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 
278 F.2d 79, 89-91 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960) (level of scrutiny depends on 
length and complexity of case). 
8 8
 No substitution of judge's judgment. Taber Partners I v. Insurance Co. of N. A., Inc., 917 
F. Supp. 112, 116 (D.P.R. 1996) (fact that contrary verdict could have been equally or more easily 
supportable is insufficient grounds; verdict must be demonstrably against weight of credible 
evidence or result in blatant miscarriage of justice). 
1st Circuit Taber Partners I v. Insurance Co. of N. A., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 112, 116 
(D.P.R. 1996) (fact that contrary verdict could have been equally or more 
easily supportable is insufficient grounds; verdict must be demonstrably 
against weight of credible evidence or result in blatant miscarriage of 
justice). 
5th Circuit Scott v. Monsanto Co., 868 F.2d 786, 789 (5th Cir. 1985) (jury's verdict 
must be against great, not merely greater, weight of evidence). 
89 New trial warranted only if verdict is so clearly against weight of evidence as to amount 
to manifest miscarriage of justice. Lama v. Borras,f16 F.3d 473, 477 (1st Cir. 1994) (no abuse 
of discretion to deny motion unless verdict so clearly against weight of evidence as to amount 
to manifest miscarriage of justice 
1st Circuit Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of N. A., Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 482-483 (1st 
(Matthew Bender A Co., Inc) (Re!. 116-12/97 Pub.410) 
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[B]—Applicable Standard Unclear 
The standard applied by trial courts in ruling on a motion to grant a new trial 
based on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence is 
somewhat confused. Although the criteria examined by the judge are similar to 
those examined for a motion for judgment as a matter of law (formerly judgments 
n.o.v. or directed verdicts), the standard for a new trial is distinct and less 
stringent. A court may grant judgment as a matter of law only when a rational 
juror could not possibly find for the party with the burden of proof. On such 
a motion, all issues of credibility must be resolved in favor of that party. On 
a motion for new trial, on the other hand, the judge may make his or her own 
judgments as to credibility.90 
It should be emphasized, however, that in ruling on a motion for new trial 
the court is not simply to substitute its findings for those of the jury. Rather, 
the court must be firmly convinced that the verdict is clearly inaccurate. Courts 
Cir. 1997); Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 477 (1st Cir. 1994) (no abuse 
of discretion to deny motion unless verdict so clearly against weight of 
evidence as to amount to manifest miscarriage of justice). 
3d Circuit Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 242 (D.V.I. 1995) 
(standard varies depending on basis for Rule 59 motion). 
9 0
 Applicable standard less stringent than judgment as matter of law. See Henry v. Hess 
Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 242-243 (D.V.I. 1995) (when standard for new trial 
on ground that judgment against weight of evidence not satisfied, more stringent standard for 
judgment n.o.v. or directed verdict cannot be satisfied). 
2d Circuit Katara v. D.E. Jones Commodities, Inc., 835 F.2d 966, 970 (2d Cir. 1987); 
Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh, 950 F. Supp. 1267, 1272 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(less stringent standard applies to motions for new trials than to motions 
for judgment as matter of law); Merrill v. United Air Lines, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 
68, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), ajfd, 288 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1961) (listing cases 
addressing distinction). 
3d Circuit See Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 242-243 
(D.V.I. 1995) (when standard for new trial on ground that judgment against 
weight of evidence not satisfied, more stringent standard for judgment 
n.o.v. or directed verdict cannot be satisfied). 
4th Circuit See Williams v. Nichols, 266 F.2d 389, 391-393 (4th Cir. 1959) (district 
court misapplied "light most favorable" standard, applicable to judgments 
as matter of law, to motion for new trial based on excessiveness of verdict). 
7th Circuit General Foam Fabricators, Inc. v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 695 F.2d 281, 
285 (7th Cir. 1982) (new trial properly granted when verdict against weight 
of evidence). 
8th Circuit Day v. Amax, Inc., 701 F.2d 1258, 1262 (8th Cir. 1983) (new trial standard 
less stringent than standard for judgment n.o.v. or directed verdict). 
(Mitlhcw Bender & Co.. Inc.) (Rel. 116-12/97 Pub.410) 
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have broad discretion in determining whether or not to grant a new trial on the 
ground that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence (see also [A], 
above).91 Thus, it is hot necessary to make a showing that the evidence submitted 
at trial is legally insufficient to support the verdict to support the grant of a new 
trial. Stated differently, a judge may grant a new trial motion even though 
substantial evidence supports the verdict.92 
However, the mere fact that the evidence is conflicting is insufficient to set 
aside the verdict,93 and increasingly serious conflicts in the evidence may require 
9
* Broad discretion. Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 89-91 (3d Cir. 1960), cert, 
denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1961). 
3d Circuit Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 89-91 (3d Cir. 1960), cert, 
denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1961). 
10th Circuit Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638, 643 (10th Cir. 1962) (motion 
involves discretion that exceeds mere sufficiency of evidence and embraces 
all reasons inherent in integrity of judicial system). 
9 2
 Substantial evidence no bar to granting new trial. Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 477 (1st 
Cir. 1994) (substantial evidence supporting verdict does not bar grant of new trial). 
1st Circuit Lama v. Borras, 16 F.3d 473, 477 (1st Cir. 1994) (substantial evidence 
supporting verdict does not bar grant of new trial). 
2d Circuit Song v. Ives Labs., Inc., 957 F.2d 1041, 1047 (2d Cir. 1992) (new trial 
may be granted when substantial evidence supports jury's verdict); Isley 
v. Motown Record Corp., 69 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.C. N.Y. 1975) (judge must 
grant new trial when verdict is based on false evidence or results in 
miscarriage of justice even when supported by substantial evidence that 
would preclude directed verdict). 
3d Circuit Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 242 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(court's power to overturn judgment on challenge that judgment is against 
weight of evidence is severely circumscribed). 
4th Circuit Poynter v. Ratcliff, 874 F.2d 219, 222-223 (4th Cir. 1989) (judge must 
grant new trial when verdict against clear weight of evidence, based on 
false evidence, or result in miscarriage of justice even when supported by 
substantial evidence). 
5th Circuit Hampton v. Magnolia Towing Co., 338 F.2d 303, 306-307 (5th Cir. 1964) 
(substantial evidence no bar against granting new trial; court has discretion 
to grant new trial when jury verdict is against weight of evidence). 
7th Circuit See General Foam Fabricators, Inc. v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 695 F.2d 281, 
285, 288 (7th Cir. 1982) (new trial properly granted when verdict against 
i weight of evidence). 
9 3
 Conflicting evidence insufficient. Taber Partners I v. Insurance Co. of N. A., Inc., 917 F. 
Supp. 112, 116 (D.P.Ri 1996) (fact that contrary verdict could have been equally or more easily 
supportable is insufficient grounds). 
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greater reluctance on the part of the trial judge to grant a new trial.94 Some courts 
have applied a type of "shocks-the-conscience" test to determine if a new trial 
is warranted.95 
[g]—Damage Issues 
[i]—New Trial When Verdict Entirely Disproportionate to Injury 
A motion for a new trial on the issue of damages, governed by Rule 59(a), 
will be granted when the amount of the verdict is so unreasonable as to be entirely 
disproportionate to the plaintiffs injury.96 
1st Circuit Taber Partners I v. Insurance Co. of N. A., Inc., 917 F Supp 112, 116 
(D.P.R. 1996) (fact that contrary verdict could have been equally or more 
easily supportable is insufficient grounds). 
5th Circuit Dawson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 978 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(conflict in evidence insufficient). 
9 4
 More conflict, less likely to grant new trial. See Carroll v. Jaques, 927 F. Supp. 216, 223-224 
(D. Tex. 1996) (factor leaning against new trial is degree to which evidence is disputed). 
5th Circuit See Carroll v. Jaques, 927 F. Supp. 216, 223-224 (D. Tex. 1996) (factor 
leaning Against new trial is degree to which evidence is disputed). 
11th Circuit Williams v. Valdosta, 689 F.2d 964,973-976 (11th Cir. 1982) (judge should 
be increasingly leery of granting new trial (and substituting judge's 
determinations for that of jury) when evidence in serious conflict; appellate 
court found no great weight of evidence in either direction, holding that 
grant of new trial is abuse of discretion 
»5 Shocks conscience test. Henry v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 163 F.R.D. 237, 242 (3d 
Cir. (1995), quoting Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F. 2d 149, 152 (3d Cir. 1979) (verdict must 
be so unreasonable as to offend conscience of court); Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 
F. 2d 1344, 1349 (3d Cir. 1991) (new trial granted when verdict so clearly against weight of 
evidence as to result in miscarriage of justice or when verdict, on record, cries out to be overturned 
or shocks conscience). 
9
* Verdict entirely disproportionate to injury. Eiland v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 58 F.3d 
176, 183 (5th Cir. 1995); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). 
3d Circuit Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1100 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(new trial may be granted when verdict is entirely disproportionate to 
injury); Zarow-Smith v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 953 F. Supp. 
581, 590-591 (D.N.J. 1997) (damages for pecuniary loss without damages 
for pain and suffering does not mandate new trial; jury's decision not to 
make additional award is reasonable and verdict is not so inadequate as 
to be entirely disproportionate to injury). 
5th Circuit Eiland v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 58 F.3d 176, 183 (5th Cir. 1995). 
(Matthew Bender & Co, Inc.) (Rel 116-12/97 Pub 410) 
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[b]—Effect of Motion 
On a motion for new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may 
open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,141 
and direct the entry of a new judgment.142 
[c]—Motion to Reopen Distinguished 
A Rule 59 motion is distinct from,a motion to reopen to take additional 
testimony. A Rule 59 motion is made only after the entry of a judgment, whereas 
a motion to reopen is most commonly made before the jury has returned its 
verdict,143 or while the judge has the case under advisement in nonjury actions. 
In a motion to reopen, the movant seeks to enter additional testimony into the 
record; because no judgment exists, the moving party is not seeking modification 
of an existing judgment. Although similar to a Rule 59 or Rule 60(b) motion 
based on newly discovered evidence, a motion to reopen does not require that 
the evidence be newly discovered or that it could not have been discovered during 
the pendency of the trial by a party acting with due diligence {see 
§ 59.13[2][c]).144 
6th Circuit Hager v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 489 F. Supp. 317, 321 (D. Tenn. 1977), 
aff'd without op., 615 F.2d 1360 (6th Cir. 1980) (substantial reasons 
required to set aside judgment). 
141 New testimony and findings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). 
6th Circuit Television Reception Corp. v. Dunbar, 426 F.2d 174, 180-181 (6th Cir. 
1970) (when affidavit stated that evidence from unavailable witness 
contradicted fact found by court, that evidence was not cumulative or 
impeaching and would likely lead to new result, abuse of discretion not 
to open judgment and take new testimony). 
D.C. Circuit Halper v. Browning, King & Co., 325 F.2d 644,645 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (when 
parties misunderstood relative burdens of proof, judgment could be opened 
to take new testimony and make new findings and conclusions). 
142 N e w judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). 
9th Circuit Brooks Bros. v. Brooks Clothing of Ca., Ltd., 5 F.R.D. 14, 15-16 (D. Cal. 
1945) (court may amend findings and judgment and enter new judgment; 
court may not modify and enter judgment for losing party). 
i 4 3 N o motion to reopen after jury has been discharged. Langdon v. Taylor, 180 F. 385, 
387 (2d Cir. 1910) (motion to reopen after jury is discharged generally requires new trial unless 
parties waive their right to jury trial on issues raised by additional proof). 
1 4 4 Nature of motion to reopen. See Caracci v. Brother Int'l Sewing Mach. Corp., 222 F. Supp. 
769, 777 (E.D. La. 1963), ajfd, 341 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1965) (motion to reopen and take additional 
testimony is "cannibalization" of qualities found in Rules 59 and 60). 
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc.) (Rel. 116-12/97 Pub.410) 
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Like a Rule 59 motion, a motion to reopen may be granted or denied in the 
district court's discretion.145 The court must decide the motion in the interest 
of fairness and justice. A motion to reopen a bench trial is more likely to be 
granted than a motion to reopen a jury trial.146 Similarly, a motion made during 
the early deliberations of a jury is more likely to be granted than a motion made 
later in the deliberations, or after the jury has given some indication of its verdict. 
[4]—Insufficient Grounds 
A new trial may not be granted merely because the losing party may be able 
to present a better case in another trial.147 
[5]—New Trial for Less Than AH Parties 
Rule 59(a) provides that a new trial may be granted to any or all of the parties 
to ail action.148 Thus, in an action with multiple parties, the trial court has the 
discretion to grant a new trial only to some but not all of the injured parties 
as justice dictates. In such a case, the verdict stands as to the unaffected parties. 
It is not error for & court to grant a new trial to defendants found liable while 
allowing the verdict to stand as to another defendant found not liable.149 
1 4 5
 Motion to reopen lies within court's discretion. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 
Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 331, 91 S. Ct. 795, 28 L. Ed. 2d 77 (1971) (citing Moore's; like motion to 
amend pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), motion to reopen to submit additional proof is 
addressed to court's sound discretion). 
14
* Reopening more likely in court trial. See, e.g., Gile v. Duke, 5 F.2d 952, 953 (9th Cir. 
1925) (reopening proper to allow plaintiff to supply certain defects and omission in proof to oppose 
defendant's motion to dismiss made at end of plaintiffs case). 
147 Presentation of better case. 
2d Circuit Ball v. Interoceanica Corp., 71 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1995), cert, denied, 
117 S. Ct. 169 (1996) (quoting Moore's, holding that Rule 59(a) motion 
for new trial should not be granted "merely because the losing party can 
probably present a better case on another trial"); see Cifarelli v. Village 
of Babylon, 93 F.3d 47, 53 (2d Cir. 1996) (argument that court should 
ignore opposition affidavit because plaintiff not permitted reply fails when 
plaintiff knew of defense before seeing affidavit). 
14
»S** Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a). 
149 N e w trial for less than all of multiple parties. See Juneau Square Corp. v. First Wis. Nat'l 
Bank, 624 F.2d 798, 811 (7th Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 1013 (1980) (grant of new trial to party 
who has received adverse verdict does not require grant of new trial to party who has received 
favorable verdict). 
1st Circuit Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 n.5 (1st Cir. 1993) (grant of new trial 
to one party but not to another). 
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R156. Commerce, Occupational and Professional Licensing. 
R156-55a. Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act Rules. 
R156-55a-101. Title. 
These rules shall be known as the "Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act Rules". 
R156-55a-102. Definitions. 
In addition to the definitions in Title 58, Chapters 1 and 55, as defined or used in 
these rules: 
(1) "Current financial statements" means a statement of financial position/balance 
sheet and a statement of earnings/income or profit and loss statement including the 
schedules and notes that pertain thereto. These statements are to be prepared in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles presented in a format approved by 
the division and covering a period of time ending no earlier than the last tax year end 
for the entity submitting the statements. 
(2) "Employee", as used in Subsections 58-55-2(6) and 58-55-2(8), means a person 
providing labor or services in the construction trades for compensation, whether the 
amount of compensation is ascertained on the basis of time, task, piece, commission, or 
other unit of measure, who has federal and state taxes withheld and workers' compensation 
and unemployment insurance provided by the person's employer. 
(3) "Experience," as set forth in Subsections 58-55-5(1)(e)(ii) and R156-55a-
302a(2)(b), shall mean: 
(a) a minimum of four years full-time related experience, two years of which shall 
be in a supervisory or managerial position for applicants of contractor classifications 
ElOO General Engineering, BlOO General Building, and RlOO Residential and Small Commercial 
Building; 
(b) a minimum of four years of full-time related experience for applicants of 
contractor classifications S280 General Roofing, S290 General Masonry, S280 Steel 
Erection, S360 Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning, S360 Refrigeration and S370 Fire 
Suppression Systems; 
(c) a minimum of two years of full-time related experience for applicants of 
contractor classifications not listed in Subsections (a) and (b) above. 
(4) "Maintenance" means the repair, replacement and refinishing of any component of 
an existing structure; but, does not include alteration or modification to the existing 
weight-bearing structural components. 
(5) "Mechanical", as used in Subsections 58-55-2(11) and 58-55-2(23) means the work 
which may be performed by a S350 HVAC Contractor under Subsection R156-55a-301(3). 
(6) "Owners equity" means the difference obtained by subtracting total liabilities 
from total assets. 
(7) "Personal property" means, as it relates to Title 58, Chapter 56, factory built 
housing and modular construction, a structure which is titled by the Motor Vehicles 
Division, state of Utah, and taxed as personal property. 
(8) "Pro Forma" means, as applied to an income statement, an income statement using 
best estimates of the revenues, expenses and other entries on the statement. The format 
for the statement shall be that generally accepted for such a statement and shall cover a 
future period of not less than one year. 
(9) "Total assets" means the total of current assets, plant and equipment, and any 
other tangible assets listed on the balance sheet. It does not include "good will" or 
other intangible assets. 
(10) "Unprofessional conduct" defined in Title 58, Chapters 1 and 55, is further 
defined in accordance with Subsection 58-1-203(5) to include: 
(a) failure by a licensee to notify the division with respect to any matter for 
which notification is required under these rules or Title 58, Chapter 55, the Construction 
Trades Licensing Act, including the loss of insurance coverage or change in qualifier. 
Such failure shall be considered by the division and the board as grounds for immediate 
suspension of the contractors license. 
(11) "Working capital" means the difference obtained by subtracting current 
liabilities from current assets. 
R156-55a-103. Authority. 
These rules are adopted by the division under the authority of Subsection 58-1-
106(1) to enable the division to administer Title 58, Chapter 55. 
R156-55a-104. Organization - Relationship to Rule R156-1. 
The organization of this rule and its relationship to Rule R156-1 is as described in 
Section R156-1-107. 
R156-55a-301. License Classifications - Scope of Practice. 
(1) Licenses shall be issued in the license classifications or subclassifications 
set forth in Subsection (2) of this section. A person licensed in any primary 
0088 
classification shall be qualiried and permitted to perform the work defined under any 
license subclassification of that primary classification, A person licensed only in a 
subclassification shall be qualified and permitted to perform the work defined under that 
subclassification only. A specialty contractor may perform work in crafts or trades other 
than those in which he is licensed if they are clearly incidental to the performance of 
his licensed craft or trade. 
(2) Licenses shall be issued in the following primary classifications and 
subclassifications: 
TABLE 
Primary 
Classification 
Number 
Subclassification 
Number Title 
E100 
B100 
R100 
R101 
R200 
S200 
S210 
S220 
S230 
S240 
S250 
S260 
S201 
S211 
S212 
S213 
S214 
S215 
S216 
S221 
S231 
S261 
S262 
S270 
General Engineering 
Contractor 
General Building 
Contractor 
Residential and Small 
Commercial Contractor 
Residential and 
Small Commercial 
Non-Structural 
Remodeling and 
Repair 
Factory Built Housing 
Set-Up Contractor 
General Electrical 
Contractor 
Residential 
Electrical 
Contractor 
General Plumbing 
Contractor 
Boiler Installation 
Contractor 
Irrigation 
Sprinkling 
Contractor 
Industrial Piping 
Contractor 
Water Conditioning 
Equipment Contractor 
Solar Energy 
Systems Contractor 
Residential Sewer 
Connection and Septic 
Tank Contractor 
Carpentry Contractor 
Cabinet and Millwork 
Installation 
Contractor 
Metal and Vinyl Siding 
Contractor 
Raingutter 
Installation 
Contractor 
Glass and Glazing 
Contractor 
Insulation Contractor 
General Concrete 
Contractor 
Concrete Form 
Setting and Shoring 
Contractor 
Gunnite and Pressure 
Grouting Contractor 
General Drywall, 
hnoQ 
S271 
S272 
S273 
S280 
S290 
S281 
S282 
S283 
S284 
S285 
S291 
S292 
S293 
S300 
S310 
S320 
S330 
S340 
S350 
S321 
S322 
S323 
S351 
S352 
S353 
S360 
S370 
S380 
S390 
S400 
S410 
S420 
Stucco and Plastering 
Contractor 
Plastering and Stucco 
Contractor 
Ceiling Grid 
Systems, Ceiling 
Tile and 
Panel Systems 
Contractor 
Light-weight Metal 
and Non-bearing Wall 
Partitions 
Contractor 
General Roofing 
Contractor 
Single Ply and 
Specialty Coating 
Contractor 
Build-up Roofing 
Contractor 
Shingle and Shake 
Roofing Contractor 
Tile Roofing 
Contractor 
Metal Roofing 
Contractor 
General Masonry 
Contractor 
Stone Masonry 
Contractor 
Terrazzo Contractor 
Marble, Tile and 
Ceramic Contractor 
General Painting 
Contractor 
Excavation and Grading 
Contractor 
Steel Erection 
Contractor 
Steel Reinforcing 
Contractor 
Metal Building 
Erection Contractor 
Structural Stud 
Erection Contractor 
Landscaping Contractor 
Sheet Metal Contractor 
HVAC Contractor 
Refrigerated Air 
Conditioning 
Contractor 
Evaporative Cooling 
Contractor 
Warm Air Heating 
Contractor 
Refrigeration 
Contractor 
Fire Supression 
Systems Contractor 
Swimming Pool and Spa 
Contractor 
Sewer and Water 
Pipeline Contractor 
Asphalt Paving 
Contractor 
Pipeline and Conduit 
Contractor 
General Fencing and 
Guardrail Contractor 
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S421 Residential Fencing 
Contractor 
S430 Metal Firebox and Fuel 
Burning Stove 
Installer 
S440 Sign Installation 
Contractor 
S441 Non Electrical 
Outdoor Advertising 
Sign Contractor 
S450 Mechanical Insulation 
Contractor 
S460 Wrecking and 
Demolition Contractor 
S470 Petroleum System 
Contractor 
S480 Piers and Foundations 
Contractor 
(3) The license classifications and subclassifications are defined as follows: 
E100 - General Engineering Contractor. A General Engineering contractor is a 
contractor licensed to perform work as defined in Subsection 58-55-2(12). 
B100 - General Building Contractor. A General Building contractor is a contractor 
licensed to perform work as defined in Subsection 58-55-2(11). 
R100 - Residential and Small Commercial Contractor. A Residential and Small 
Commercial contractor is a contractor licensed to perform work as defined in Subsection 
58-55-2(23). 
R101 - Residential and Small Commercial Non Structural Remodeling and Repair. 
Remodeling and repair to any existing structure built for support, shelter and enclosure 
of persons, animals, chattels or movable property of any kind with the restriction that no 
change is made to the bearing portions of the existing structure, including footings, 
foundation and weight bearing walls; and the entire project is less than $1,000,000 in 
total cost. 
R200 - Factory Built Housing Set Up Contractor. Set up or installation of 
manufactured housing on a temporary or permanent basis. The scope of the work permitted 
under this classification includes placement of the manufactured housing on a permanent or 
temporary foundation, securing the units together if required, securing the manufactured 
housing to the foundation, and connection of the utilities to the manufactured housing 
unit. Work excluded from this classification includes site preparation or finishing, 
construction of a permanent foundation and construction of utility services to the near 
proximity of the manufactured housing unit from which they are connected to the unit. 
S200 - General Electrical Contractor. Fabrication, construction, and/or 
installation of generators, transformers, conduits, raceways, panels, switch gear, 
electrical wiresr fixtures, appliances, or apparatus which utilizes electrical energy. 
S201_- Residential Electrical Contractor. Fabrication, construction, and/or 
installation of services, disconnecting means, grounding devices, panels, conductors, load 
centers, lighting and plug circuits, appliances and fixtures in any residential unit, 
normally requiring non-metallic sheathed cable, including multiple units up to and 
including five-plex, but excluding any work generally recognized in the industry as 
commercial or industrial. 
5210 - General Plumbing Contractor. Fabrication and/or installation of material 
and fixtures to create and maintain sanitary conditions in buildings, by providing a 
permanent means for a supply of safe and pure water, a means for the timely and complete 
removal from the premises of all used or contaminated water, fluid and semi-fluid organic 
wastes and other impurities incidental to life and the occupation of such premises, and 
provision of a safe and adequate supply of gases for lighting, heating, and industrial 
purposes. Work permitted under this classification shall include the furnishing of 
materials, fixtures and labor to extend service from a building out to the main water, 
sewer or gas pipeline. 
5211 - Boiler Installation Contractor. Fabrication and/or installation of fire-tube 
and water-tube power boilers and hot water heating boilers, including all fittings and 
piping, valves, gauges, pumps, radiators, converters, fuel oil tanks, fuel lines, chimney 
flues, heat insulation and all other devices, apparatus, and equipment related thereto. 
5212 - Irrigation Sprinkling Contractor. Layout, fabrication, and/or installation 
of water distribution system for artificial watering or irrigation. 
5213 - Industrial Piping Contractor. Fabrication and/or installation of pipes and 
piping for the conveyance or transmission of steam, gases, chemicals, and other substances 
including excavating, trenching, and back-filling related to such work. 
5214 - Water Conditioning Equipment Contractor. Fabrication and/or installation of 
0091 
water conditioning equipment, and only such pipe and fittings *»s are necessary for 
connecting the water conditioning equipment to the water supply system within the 
premises. 
5215 - Solar Energy Systems Contractor. Fabrication and/or installation of solar 
energy systems. 
5216 - Residential Sewer Connection and Septic Tank Contractor. Construction of 
residential sewer lines including connection to the public sewer line, and excavation and 
grading related thereto. Excavation, installation and grading of residential septic tanks 
and their drainage. 
5220 - Carpentry Contractor. Fabrication for structural and finish purposes in a 
structure or building using wood and wood products as is by custom and usage accepted in 
the building industry as carpentry. 
5221 - Cabinet and Millwork Installation Contractor. On-site construction and/or 
installation of milled wood products. 
5230 - Metal and Vinyl Siding Contractor. Fabrication, construction, and/or 
installation of wood, aluminum, steel or vinyl sidings. 
5231 - Raingutter Installation Contractor. On-site fabrication and/or installation 
of raingutters and drains, roof flashings, gravel stops and metal ridges. 
S240 - Glass and Glazing Contractor. Fabrication, construction, installation, 
and/or removal of all types and sizes of glass, mirrors, substitutes for glass, glass-
holding members, frames, hardware, and other incidental related work. 
S250 - Insulation Contractor. Installation of any insulating media in buildings and 
structures for the sole purpose of temperature or sound control. 
5260 - General Concrete Contractor. Fabrication, construction, mixing, batching, 
and/or installation of concrete and related concrete products along with the placing and 
setting of screeds for pavement for flatwork, the construction of forms, placing and 
erection of steel bars for reinforcing and application of plaster and other cement-related 
products. 
5261 - Concrete Form Setting and Shoring Contractor. Fabrication, construction, 
and/or installation of forms and shoring material; but, does not include the placement of 
concrete, finishing of concrete or embedded items such as metal reinforcement bars or 
mesh. 
5262 - Gunnite and Pressure Grouting Contractor. Installation of a concrete product 
either injected or sprayed under pressure. 
5270 - General Drywall, Stucco and Plastering Contractor. Fabrication, 
construction, and/or installation of drywall, gypsum, wallboard panels and assemblies. 
Preparation of surfaces for suitable painting or finishing. Installation of light-weight 
metal, non-bearing wall partitions, ceiling grid systems, and ceiling tile or panel 
systems. 
5271 - Plastering and Stucco Contractor. Application to surfaces of coatings made 
of stucco and plaster, including the preparation of the surface and the provision of a 
base. 
5272 - Ceiling Grid Systems, Ceiling Tile and Panel Systems Contractor. Fabrication 
and/or installation of wood, mineral, fiber, and other types of ceiling tile and panels 
and the grid systems required for placement. 
5273 - Light-weight Metal and Non-bearing Wall Partitions Contractor. Fabrication 
and/or installation of light-weight metal and other non-bearing wall partitions. 
5280 - General Roofing Contractor. Application and/or installation of asphalt, 
pitch, tar, felt, flax, shakes, shingles, roof tile, slate, and any other material or 
materials, or any combination of any thereof which use and custom has established as 
usable for, or which are now used as, water-proof, weatherproof, or watertight seal or 
membranes for roofs and surfaces; and roof conversion. 
5281 - Single Ply and Specialty Coating Contractor. Application of solutions of 
rubber, latex, or other materials or single-ply material to surfaces to prevent, hold, 
keep, and stop water, other liquids, derivatives, compounds, and solids from penetrating 
and passing such materials thereby gaining access to material or space beyond such 
waterproofing. 
5282 - Build-up Roofing Contractor. Application of solutions of rubber, latex, 
asphalt, pitch, tar, or other materials in conjunction with the application of layers, 
felt, or other material to a roof or other surface. 
5283 - Shingle and Shake Roofing Contractor. Application of shingles and shakes 
made of wood or any other material. 
5284 - Tile Roofing Contractor. Application or installation of tile roofs including 
under layment material and sealing and reinforcement of weight bearing roof structures for 
the purpose of supporting the weight of the tile. 
5285 - Metal Roofing Contractor. On-site fabrication and/or application of metal 
roofing materials. 
S290 - General Masonry Contractor. Construction by cutting, and/or laying of all of 
the following brick, block, or forms: architectural, industrial, and refractory brick, all 
r\ f\ r\ o 
brick substitutes, clay and concrete blocks, terracotta, thin set or structural quarry 
tile, glazed structural tile, gypsum tile, glass block, clay tile, copings, natural stone, 
plastic refractories, and castables and any incidental works as required in construction 
of the masonry work. 
5291 — Stone Masonry Contractor. Construction using natural or artificial stone, 
either rough or cut and dressed, laid at random, with or without mortar. 
5292 - Terrazzo Contractor. Construction by fabrication, grinding, and polishing of 
terrazzo by the setting of chips of marble, stone, or other material in an irregular 
pattern with the use of cement, polyester, epoxy or other common binders. 
5293 - Marble, Tile and Ceramic Contractor. Preparation, fabrication, construction, 
and installation of artificial marble, burned clay tile, ceramic, encaustic, faience, 
quarry, semi-vitreous, and other tile, excluding hollow or structural partition tile. 
S300 - General Painting Contractor. Preparation of surface and the application of 
all paints, varnishes, shellacs, stains, waxes and other coatings or pigments by the use 
of brushes, spray or rollers. 
S310 - Excavation and Grading Contractor. Moving of the earth's surface or placing 
earthen materials on the earth's surface, by use of hand or power machinery and tools, 
including explosives, in any operation of cut, fill, excavation, grading, trenching, 
backfilling, or combination thereof as they are generally practiced in the construction 
trade. 
5320 - Steel Erection Contractor. Construction by fabrication, placing, and tying 
or welding of steel reinforcing bars or erecting structural steel shapes, plates of any 
profile, perimeter or cross-section that are used to reinforce concrete or as structural 
members, including riveting, welding, and rigging. 
5321 - Steel Reinforcing Contractor. Fabricating, placing, tying, or mechanically 
welding of reinforcing bars of any profile that are used to reinforce concrete buildings 
or structures. 
5322 - Metal Building Erection Contractor. Erection of pre-fabricated metal 
structures including concrete foundation and footings, grading, and surface preparation. 
5323 - Structural Stud Erection Contractor. Fabrication and installation of metal 
structural studs and bearing walls. 
S330 - Landscaping Contractor. Grading and preparing land for architectural, 
horticultural, and the decorative treatment, arrangement, and planting or gardens, lawns, 
shrubs, vines, bushes, trees, and other decorative vegetation. Construction of pools, 
tanks, fountains, hot and green houses, retaining walls, patio areas when they are an 
incidental part of the prime contract, fences, walks, garden lighting of 50 volts or less, 
and sprinkler systems. 
S340 - Sheet Metal Contractor. Layout, fabrication, and installation of air 
handling and ventilating systems. All architectural sheet metal such as cornices, 
marquees, metal soffits, gutters, flashings, and skylights and skydomes including both 
plastic and fiberglass. 
5350 - HVAC Contractor. Fabrication and installation of complete warm air heating 
and air conditioning systems, and complete ventilating systems. 
5351 * Refrigerated Air Conditioning Contractor. Fabrication and installation of 
air conditioning ventilating systems to control air temperatures below 50 degrees. 
5352 - Evaporative Cooling Contractor. Fabrication and installation of devices, 
machinery, and units to cool the air temperature employing evaporation of liquid. 
5353 - Warm Air Heating Contractor. Layout, fabrication, and installation of such 
sheet metal, gas piping, and furnace equipment as necessary for a complete warm air 
heating and ventilating system. 
S360 - Refrigeration Contractor. Construction and/or installation of refrigeration 
equipment including, but not limited to, built-in refrigerators, refrigerated rooms, 
insulated refrigerated spaces and equipment related thereto; but, the scope of permitted 
work does not include the installation of gas fuel or electric power services other than 
connection of electrical devices to a junction box provided for that device and electrical 
control circuitry not exceeding 50 volts. 
S370 - Fire Supression Systems Contractor. Layout, fabrication, and installation of 
fire protection systems using water, steam, gas, or chemicals. When a potable sanitary 
water supply system is used as the source of supply, connection to the water system must 
be accomplished by a licensed journeyman plumber. 
S380 - Swimming Pool and Spa Contractor. Onsight fabrication, construction and 
installation of swimming pools, spas, and tubs. 
S390 - Sewer and Water Pipeline Contractor. Construction of sewer lines, sewage 
disposal and sewage drain facilities including excavation and grading with respect 
thereto, and the construction of sewage disposal plants and appurtenances thereto. 
S400 - Asphalt Paving Contractor. Construction of asphalt highways, roadways, 
driveways, parking lots or other asphalt surfaces including excavation, grading, 
compacting and laying of fill or base-related thereto. 
S410 - Pipeline and Conduit Contractor. Fabrication, construction, and installation 
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of pipes for the conveyance and transmission from one station to another of such products 
as water, steam, gases, chemicals, or sturries. Included are the excavation, grading, and 
backfilling necessary for construction of the system. 
5420 - General Fencing and Guardrail Contractor. Fabrication, construction, and 
installation of fences, guardrails, and barriers. 
5421 - Residential Fencing Contractor. Fabrication and installation of wire, metal 
or wood residential fencing up to and including a height of six feet. 
S430 - Metal Firebox and Fuel Burning Stove Installer. Fabrication, construction, 
and installation of metal fireboxes, fireplaces, and wood or coal-burning stoves. 
5440 - Sign Installation Contractor. Installation of signs and graphic displays 
which require installation permits or permission as issued by state or local governmental 
jurisdictions. Signs and graphic displays shall include signs of all types, both lighted 
and unlighted, permanent highway marker signs, illuminated awnings, electronic message 
centers, sculptures or graphic representations including logos and trademarks intended to 
identify or advertise the user or his product, building trim or lighting with neon or 
decorative fixtures, or any other animated, moving or stationary device used for 
advertising or identification purposes. Signs and graphic displays must be fabricated, 
installed and erected in accordance with professionally engineered specifications and 
wiring in accordance with the National Electrical Code. 
5441 - Non Electrical Outdoor Advertising Sign Contractor. Installation of signs 
and graphic displays which require installation permits or permission as issued by state 
and local governmental jurisdictions. Signs and graphics shall include outdoor 
advertising signs which do not have electrical lighting or other electrical requirements, 
and in accordance with professionally engineered specifications. 
S450 - Mechanical Insulation Contractor. Fabrication, application and installation 
of insulation materials to pipes, ducts and conduits. 
S460 - Wrecking and Demolition Contractor. The raising, cribbing, underpinning, 
moving, and removal of building and structures so that alterations, additions, repairs, 
and new sub-structures may be built. 
S470 - Petroleum Systems Contractor. Installation of above and below ground 
petroleum and petro-chemical storage tanks, piping, dispensing equipment, monitoring 
equipment and associated petroleum and petro-chemical equipment including excavation, 
backfilling, concrete and asphalt. 
S480 - Piers and Foundations Contractor. The excavation, drilling, compacting, 
pumping, sealing and other work necessary to construct, alter or repair piers, piles, 
footings and foundations placed in the earth's subsurface to prevent structural settling 
and to provide an adequate capacity to sustain or transmit the structural load to the soil 
or rock below. 
R156-55a-302a. Qualifications for Licensure - Examinations. 
(1) The division, in collaboration with the board, shall adopt a competent 
examination designed to determine whether an applicant for a contractors license meets the 
minimum standard necessary for a person to practice as a contractor in the particular 
primary classification or subclassification in which licensure is requested. 
(2) An applicant for a contractors license shall pass the following examinations as 
a condition precedent to licensure as a contractor: 
(a) the classification specific examination adopted by the division in accordance 
with Subsection (1) of this section; and 
(b) the Utah Contractor Law Examination. 
(3) The passing score for each examination required for licensure is 70%. 
(4) The application for examination, conduct of the examination, content of the 
examination, scoring of the examination and notification of examination results shall be 
in accordance with current publications of the division. 
R156-55a-302b. Qualifications for Licensure - Experience Requirements. 
(1) Each applicant for a contractors license shall bear the burden and 
responsibility for presenting to the division and the board satisfactory evidence that the 
applicant or the applicant's qualifier has that knowledge and experience in the work 
required of a contractor to provide reasonable assurance the applicant can engage 
successfully in business as a contractor. 
(2) The division and board shall consider all evidence presented including: 
(a) construction related education as approved by the division: 
(i) in contractor work; 
(ii) in the conduct of business; 
(b) experience in the construction crafts or trades relating to the classification 
or subclassification in which licensure is sought: 
(i) type and length of experience; 
(A) as a laborer, craftsman or tradesman; 
(B) as a supervisor or manager; 
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